Blessed John Duns Scotus

Surnamed DOCTOR SUBTILIS, died 8 November, 1308; he was the founder and

leader of the famous Scotist School, which had its chief representatives among

the Franciscans. Of his antecedents and life very little is definitely known, as the

contemporary sources are silent about him. It is certain that he died rather

young, according to earlier traditions at the age of thirty-four years (cf. Wadding,

Vita Scoti, in vol. I of his works); but it would seem that he was somewhat older

than this and that he was born in 1270. The birthplace of Scotus has been the

subject of much discussion and so far no conclusive argument in favour of any

locality has been advanced. The surname Scotus by no means decides the

question, for it was given to Scotchmen, Irishmen, and even to natives of northern

England. The other name, Duns, to which the Irish attach so much importance,

settles nothing; there was a Duns also in Scotland (Berwick). Moreover, it is

impossible to determine whether Duns was a family name or the name of a

place. Appeal to supposedly ancient local traditions in behalf of Ireland's claim is

of no avail, since we cannot ascertain just how old they are; and their age is the

pivotal point.

This discussion has been strongly tinged with national sentiment, especially

since the beginning of the sixteenth century after prominent Irish Franciscans

like Mauritius de Portu (O'Fihely), Hugh MacCaghwell, and Luke Wadding

rendered great service by editing Scotus's works. On the other hand, the English

have some right to claim Scotus; as a professor for several years at Oxford, he

belonged at any rate to the English province; and neither during his lifetime nor

for some time after his death was any other view as to his nationality proposed. It

should not, however, be forgotten that in those days the Franciscan cloisters in

Scotland were affiliated to the English province, i.e. to the custodia of Newcastle.

It would not therefore be amiss to regard Scotus as a native of Scotland or as a

member of a Scottish cloister. In any case it is high time to eliminate from this

discussion the famous entry in the Merton College MS. (no. 39) which would

make it appear that Scotus was a member of that college and therefore a native

of Northern England. The statutes of the college excluded monks; and as Scotus

became a Franciscan when he was quite younger he could not have belonged to

the college previous to joining the order. Besides, the entry in the college register

is under the date of 1455, and consequently too late to serve as an argument.

The case is somewhat better with the entry in the catalogue of the library of St.

Francis at Assisi, under date of 1381, which designates Duns Scotus's

commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard as "magistri fratris Johannis

Scoti de Ordine Minorum, qui et Doctor Subtilis nuncupatur, de provincia

Hiberniæ" (the work of master John Scotus of the Franciscan Order known as

the subtle doctor, from the province of Ireland). This, though it furnishes the

strongest evidence in Ireland's favour, cannot be regarded as decisive. Since

Scotus laboured during several years in England, he cannot, simply on the

strength of this evidence, be assigned to the Irish province. The library entry,

moreover, cannot possibly be accepted as contemporary with Scotus. Add to

this the geographical distance and it becomes plain that the discussion cannot

be settled by an entry made in far-off Italy seventy-three years after Scotus's

death, at a time too when geographical knowledge was by no means perfect.

Finally, no decisive evidence is offered by the epitaphs of Scotus; they are too

late and too poetical. The question, then, of Scotus's native land must still be

considered an open one. When he took the habit of St. Francis is unknown;

probably about 1290. It is a fact that he lived and taught at Oxford; for on 26 July,

1300, the provincial of the English province of Franciscans asked the Bishop of

Lincoln to confer upon twenty-two of his subjects jurisdiction to hear confessions.

The bishop gave the permission only to eight; among those who were refused

was "Ioannes Douns". It is quite certain, too, that he went to Paris about 1304

and that there he was at first merely a Bachelor of Arts, for the general of the

Franciscans, Gonsalvus de Vallebona, wrote (18 November, 1304) to the

guardian of the college of the Franciscans at Paris to present John Scotus at the

university for the doctor's degree. The general's letter mentions that John Scotus

had distinguished himself for some time past by his learning ingenioque

subtilissimo. He did not teach very long in Paris; in 1307 or 1308 he was sent to

Cologne, probably as a professor at the university. There he died, and was buried

in the monastery of the Minorities. At the present time (1908) the process of his

beatification is being agitated in Rome on the ground of a cultus immemorabilis.

Duns Scotus's writings are very numerous and they have often been printed;

some, in fact, at a very early date. But a complete edition, in 12 folio volumes,

was published only in 1639 by Wadding at Lyons; this, however, included the

commentaries of the Scotists, Lychetus, Poncius, Cavellus, and Hiquæus. A

reprint of Wadding's edition, with the treatise "De perfectione statuum" added to

it, appeared 1891-95 at Paris (Vives) in 26 vols. 4to. Whether all the writings

contained in these editions are by Duns Scotus himself is doubtful; it is certain,

however, that many changes and additions were made by later Scotists. A

critical edition is still wanting. Besides these printed works, some others are

attributed to Scotus, especially commentaries on several books of Scripture. The

printed writings deal with grammatical and scientific, but chiefly with

philosophical and theological subjects. Of a purely philosophical nature are his

commentaries and quæstiones on various works of Aristotle. These, with some

other treatises, are contained in the first seven volumes of the Paris edition. The

principal work of Scotus, however, is the so-called "Opus Oxoniense", i.e. the

great commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard, written in Oxford (vols.

VIII-XXI). It is primarily a theological work, but it contains many treatises, or at

least digressions, on logical, metaphysical, grammatical, and scientific topics,

so that nearly his whole system of philosophy can be derived from this work.

Volumes XXII-XXIV contain the "Reportata Parisiensia", i.e., a smaller

commentary, for the most part theological; on the "Sentences". The

"Quæstiones Quodlibetales", chiefly on theological subjects, one of his most

important works, and the above-mentioned essay, "De perfectione statuum", fill

the last two volumes. As to the time when these works were composed, we

know nothing for certain. The commentaries on Aristotle were probably his first

work, then followed the."Opus Oxoniense" and some minor essays, last the

"Quæstiones Quodlibetales", his dissertation for the doctor's degree. The

"Reportata" may be notes written out after his lectures, but this is merely a

surmise.

Scotus seems to have changed his doctrine in the course of time, or at least not

to have been uniformly precise in expressing his thought; now he follows rather

the sententia communis as in the "Quæstiones Quodlibetales"; then again he

goes his own way. Many of his essays are unfinished. He did not write a summa

philosophica or theologica, as did Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas Aquinas,

or even a compendium of his doctrine. He wrote only commentaries or treatises

on disputed questions; but even these commentaries are not continuous

explanations of Aristotle or Peter Lombard. Usually he cites first the text or

presupposes it as already known, then he takes up various points which in that

day were live issues and discusses them from all sides, at the same time

presenting the opinions of others. He is sharp in his criticism, and with relentless

logic he refutes; the opinions, or at least the argument, of his opponents. In his

fervour he sometimes forgets to set down his own view, or he simply states the

reasons for various tenable opinions, and puts them forward as more or less

probable; this he does especially in the "Collationes". Hence it is said that he is

no systematizer, that he is better at tearing down than at building up. It is true

that none of his writings plainly reveals a system; while several of them, owing no

doubt to his early death, betray lack of finish. His real teaching is not always fully

stated where one would naturally look for it; often enough one finds instead the

discussion of some special point, or a long excursus in which the author follows

his critical bent. His own opinion is to be sought elsewhere, in various incidental

remarks, or in the presuppositions which serve as a basis for his treatment of

other problems; and it can be discovered only after a lengthy search. Besides, in

the heat of controversy he often uses expressions which seem to go to extremes

and even to contain heresy. His language is frequently obscure; a maze of terms,

definitions, distinctions, and objections through which it is by no means easy to

thread one's way. For these reasons the study of Scotus's works was difficult;

when undertaken at all, it was not carried on with the requisite thoroughness. It

was hard to find a unified system in them. Not a few unsatisfactory one-sided or

even wrong opinions about him were circulated and passed on unchallenged from

mouth to mouth and from book to book, growing more erroneous as they went.

Nevertheless, there is in Scotus's teaching a rounded-out system, to be found

especially in his principal work, a system worked out in minutest details. For the

present purpose, only his leading ideas and his departures from St. Thomas and

the sententia communis need be indicated.

SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

The fundamental principles of his philosophical and theological teaching are his

distinctio formalis and his idea of being. The distinctio formalis is intermediate

between the distinctio rationis tantum, or the distinction made by the intellect

alone, and the distinctio realis or that which exists in reality. The former occurs,

e.g., between the definition and the thing defined, the latter, within the realm of

created reality, between things that can exist separately or at least can be made

to exist separately by Divine omnipotence, as, e.g., between the different parts of

a body or between substance and accident. A thing is "formally distinct" when it

is such in essence and in concept that it can be thought of by itself, when it is

not another thing, though with that other it may be so closely united that not even

omnipotence can separate it, e.g. the soul and its faculties and these faculties

among themselves. The soul forms with its faculties only one thing (res), but

conceptually it is not identical with the intellect or the will, nor are intellect and

will the same. Thus we have various realities, entities, or formalities of one and

the same thing. So far as the thing itself exists, these entities have their own

being; for each entity has its own being or its own existence. But existence is

not identical with subsistence. The accident e.g., has its own being, its own

existence, which is different from the existence of the substance in which it

inheres, just because the accident is not identical with the substance. But it has

no subsistence of its own, since it is not a thing existing by itself, but inheres in

the substance as its subject and support; it is not an independent being.

Moreover, only actually existing; things have real being: in other words, being is

identical with existence. In the state of mere ideality or possibility, before their

realization, things have an essence, an ideal conceivable being, but not an actual

one; else they could not be created or annihilated, since they would have had an

existence before their creation. And since being is eo ipso also true and good,

only those things are really good and true which actually exist. If God, therefore,

by an act of His free will gives existence to the essences, He makes them by

this very act also true and good. In this sense, it is quite correct to say that

according to Scotus things are true and good because God so wills. By this

assertion, however, he does not deny that things are good and true in

themselves. They have an objective being, and thence also objective truth and

goodness, because they are in the likeness of God, Whose being, Goodness,

and truth they imitate. At the same time, in their ideal being they are necessary;

the ideas of them are not produced by the Divine free will, but by the Divine

intellect, which, without the co-operation of God's will, recognizes His own infinite

essence as imitable by finite things and thus of necessity conceives the ideas. In

this ideal state God necessarily wills the things, since they cannot but be

pleasing to Him as images of His own essence. But from this it does not follow

that He must will them with an effective will, i.e. that He must realize them. God

is entirely free in determining what things shall come into existence.

God alone is absolutely immaterial, since He alone is absolute and perfect

actuality, without any potentiality for becoming other than what He is. All

creatures, angels and human souls included, are material, because they are

changeable and may become the subject of accidents. But from this it does not

follow that souls and angels are corporeal; on the contrary they are spiritual,

physically simple, though material in the sense just explained. Since all created

things, corporeal and spiritual, are composed of potentiality and actuality, the

same materia prima is the foundation of all, and therefore all things have a

common substratum, a common material basis. This materia, in itself quite

indeterminate, may be determined to any sort of thing by a form--a spiritual form

determines it to a spirit, a corporeal form to a material body. Scotus, however,

does not teach an extreme Realism; he does not attribute to the universals or

abstract essences, e.g. genus and species an existence of their own,

independent of the individual beings in which they are realized. It is true, he holds

that materia prima, as the indeterminate principle, can be separated from the

forma, or the determining principle, at least by Divine omnipotence, and that it

can then exist by itself. Conceptually, the materia is altogether different from the

forma; moreover, the same materia a can be determined by entirely different

forms and the same form can be united with different materiæ, as is evident from

the processes of generation and corruption. For this reason God at least can

separate the one from the other, just as in the Holy Eucharist He keeps the

accidents of bread and wine in existence, without a substance in which they

inhere. It is no less certain that Scotus teaches a plurality of forms in the same

thing. The human body, e.g., taken by itself, without the soul, has its own form;

the forma corporeitatis. It is transmitted to the child by its parents and is different

from the rational soul, which is infused by God himself. The forma corporeitatis

gives the body a sort of human form, though quite imperfect, and remains after

the rational soul has departed from the body in death until decomposition takes

place. Nevertheless, it is the rational soul which is the essential form of the body

or of man; this constitutes with the body one being, one substance, one person,

one man. With all its faculties, vegetative sensitive and intellectual, it is the

immediate work of God, Who infuses it into the child. There is only one soul in

man, but we can distinguish in it several forms; for conceptually the intellectual is

not the same as the sensitive, nor is this identical with the vegetative, nor the

vegetative with that which gives the body, as such, its form; yet all these belong

formally, by their concept and essence, to the one indivisible soul. Scotus also

maintains a formal distinction between the universal nature of each thing and its

individuality, e.g. in Plato between his human nature and that which makes him

just Plato--his Platoneity. For the one is not the other; the individuality is added

to the human nature and with it constitutes the human individual. In this sense

the property or difference, or the hæccitas, is the principium individuationis.

Hence it is clear that there are many points of resemblance between matter and

form on the one hand and universal natures and their individualization on the

other. But Scotus is far from teaching extreme Realism. According to his view,

matter can exist without form, but not the universal essence without individuation;

nor can the different forms of the same thing exist by themselves. He does not

maintain that the uniform matter underlying all created things is the absolute

being which exists by itself, independent of the individuals, and is then

determined by added forms, first to genera, then to species, and lastly to

individuals. On the contrary, materia prima, which according to him can exist

without a form, is already something individual and numerically determined. In

reality there is no materia without form, and vice versa. The materia which God

created had already a certain form, the imperfect form of chaos. God could

create matter by itself and form by itself, but both would then be something

individual, numerically, though not specifically, different from other matter and

other forms of the same kind. This matter, numerically different from other matter,

could then be united with a form, also numerically different from other forms of

the same kind; and the result would be a compound individual, numerically

different from other individuals of the same kind. From such individualized matter,

form, and compound we get by abstraction the idea of a universal matter, a

universal form, a universal compound, e.g. of a universal man. But by themselves

universal matter and universal form cannot exist. The universal as such is a mere

conception of the mind; it cannot exist by itself, it receives its existence in and

with the individual; in and with the individual it is multiplied, in and with the

individual it loses again its existence. Even God cannot separate in man the

universal nature from the individuality, or in the human soul the intellectual from

the sensitive part, without destroying the whole. In reality there are only

individuals, in which, however, we can by abstraction formally separate both the

abstract human nature from the individuality and the several faculties from one

another. But the separation and distinction and formation of genera and species

are mere processes of thought, the work of the contemplating mind.

The psychology of Scotus is in its essentials the same as that of St. Thomas.

The starting-point of all knowledge is the sensory or outer experience, to which

must be added the inner experience, which he designates as the ultimate

criterion of certitude. He lays stress on induction as the basis of all natural

sciences. He denies that sense perception, and a fortiori intellectual knowledge,

is merely a passive process; moreover, he asserts that not only the universal but

also the individual is perceived directly. The adequate object of intellectual

knowledge is not the spiritual in the material, but being in its universality. In the

whole realm of the soul the will has the primacy since it can determine itself,

while it controls more or less completely the other faculties. The freedom of the

will, taken as freedom of choice, is emphasized and vigorously defended. In

presence of any good, even in the contemplation of God, the will is not

necessitated, but determines itself freely. This doctrine does not imply that the

will can decide what is true and what is false, what is right and what is wrong,

nor that its choice is blind and arbitrary. Objects, motives, habits, passions, etc.

exert a great influence upon the will, and incline it to choose one thing rather

than another. Yet the final decision remains with the will, and in so far the will is

the one complete cause of its act, else it would not be free. With regard to

memory, sensation, and association we find in Scotus many modern views.

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY

It has been asserted that according to Scotus the essence of God consists in

His will; but the assertion is unfounded. God, he holds, is the ens infinitum. It is

true that according to him God's love for Himself and the spiration of the Holy

Ghost by Father and Son are not based upon a natural instinct, so to say, but

upon God's own free choice. Every will is free, and therefore God's will also. But

His will is so perfect and His essence so infinitely good, that His free will cannot

but love it. This love, therefore, is at once free and necessary. Also with regard to

created things Scotus emphasizes the freedom of God, without, however, falling

into the error of merely arbitrary, unmotived indeterminism. It has been asserted,

too, that according to Scotus, being can be attributed univocally to God and

creatures; but this again is false. Scotus maintains that God is the ens per

essentiam, creatures are entia per participationem--they have being only in an

analogical sense. But from the being of God and the being of creatures, a

universal idea of being can be abstracted and predicated univocally of both the

finite and the infinite; otherwise we could not infer from the existence of finite

things the existence of God, we should have no proof of God's existence, as

every syllogism would contain a quaternio terminorum. Between God's essence

and His attributes, between the attributes themselves, and then between God's

essence and the Divine Persons, there is a formal distinction along with real

identity. For conceptually Divinity is not the same as wisdom, intellect not the

same as will; Divinity is not identical with paternity, since Divinity neither begets,

as does the Father, nor is begotten, as is the Son. But all these realities are

formally in God and their distinction is not annulled by His infinity; on the other

hand it remains true that God is only one res. The process constituting the

Blessed Trinity takes Place without regard to the external world. Only after its

completion the three Divine Persons, as one principle, produce by their act of

cognition the ideas of things. But quite apart from this process, God is

independent of the world in His knowledge and volition, for the obvious reason

that dependence of any sort wood imply imperfection.

The cognition, volition, and activity of the angels is more akin to ours. The angels

can of themselves know things; they do not need an infused species though in

fact they receive such from God. The devil is not necessarily compelled, as a

result of his sin always to will what is evil; with his splendid natural endowments

he can do what in itself is good; he can even love God above all things, though in

fact he does not do so. Sin is only in so far an infinite offense of God as it leads

away from Him; in itself its malice is no greater than is the goodness of the

opposite virtue.

In his Christology, Scotus insists strongly on the reality of Christ's Humanity.

Though it has no personality and no subsistence of its own, it has its own

existence. The unio hypostatica and the communicatio idiomatum are explained

in accordance with the doctrine of the Church, with no leaning to either

Nestorianism or Adoptionism. It is true that Scotus explains the influence of the

hypostatic union upon the human nature of Christ and upon His work differently

from St. Thomas. Since this union in no way changes the human nature of

Christ, it does not of itself impart to the Humanity the beatific vision or

impeccability. These prerogatives were given to Christ with the fullness of grace

which He received in consequence of that union. God would have become man

even if Adam had not sinned, since He willed that in Christ humanity and the

world should be united with Himself by the closest possible bond. Scotus also

defends energetically the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. All

objections founded on original sin and the universal need of redemption are

solved. The merits of Christ are infinite only in a broader sense, but of themselves

they are entirely sufficient to give adequate satisfaction to the Divine justice;

there is no deficiency to be supplied by God's mercy. But there is needed a

merciful acceptation of the work of Christ, since in the sight of God there is no

real merit in the strictest sense of the word.

Grace is something entirely supernatural and can be given only by God, and,

what is more, only by a creative act; hence the sacraments are not, properly

speaking, the physical or instrumental cause of grace, because God alone can

create. Sanctifying grace is identical with the infused virtue of charity, and has its

seat in the will; it is therefore conceived rather from the ethical standpoint. The

sacraments give grace of themselves, or ex opere operato, if man places no

obstacle in the way. The real essence of the Sacrament of Penance consists in

the absolution; but this is of no avail unless the sinner repent with a sorrow that

springs from love of God; his doctrine of attrition is by no means lax. As to his

eschatology it must suffice to state that he makes the essence of beatitude

consist in activity, i.e. in the love of God, not in the Beatific Vision; this latter is

only the necessary condition.

In ethics Scotus declares emphatically that the morality of an act requires an

object which is good in its nature, its end, and its circumstances, and according

to the dictate of right reason. It is not true that he makes God's free will decide

arbitrarily what is good and what is bad; he only asserts that the

Commandments. Of the second table of the Decalogue are not in such strict

sense laws of nature as are those of the first table; because God cannot grant a

dispensation from the laws of the first, whereas He can dispense from those of

the second; as in fact He did when He commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son.

But the precepts of the second table also are far more binding than the other

positive laws of God. In the present order of things God cannot permit

manslaughter universally, taking the property of others, and the like. There are

also indifferent actions in individuo. Absolutely speaking, man should direct all

his actions towards God; but God does not require this, because He does not

wish to burden man with so heavy a yoke. He obliges man only to observe the

Decalogue; the rest is free. Social and legal questions are not treated by Scotus

ex professo; his works, however, contain sound observations on these subjects.

RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Scotus does not, as is often asserted, maintain that science and faith can

contradict each other, or that a proposition may be true in philosophy and false in

theology and vice versa. Incorrect, also, is the statement that he attaches little

importance to showing the harmony between scientific knowledge and faith and

that he has no regard for speculative theology. Quite the contrary, he proves the

dogmas of faith not only from authority but, as far as possible, from reason also.

Theology presupposes philosophy as its basis. Facts which have God for their

author and yet can be known by our natural powers especially miracles and

prophecies, are criteria of the truth of Revelation, religion, and the Church.

Scotus strives to gain as thorough an insight as possible into the truths of faith,

to disclose them to the human mind, to establish truth upon truth, and from

dogma to prove or to reject many a philosophical proposition. There is just as

little warrant for the statement that his chief concern is humble subjection to the

authority of God and of the Church, or that his tendency a priori is to depreciate

scientific knowledge and to resolve speculative theology into doubts. Scotus

simply believes that many philosophical and theological proofs of other scholars

are not conclusive; in their stead he adduces other arguments. He also thinks

that many philosophical and theological propositions can be proved which other

Scholastics consider incapable of demonstration. He indeed lays great stress on

the authority of Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church but he also attaches

much importance to natural knowledge and the intellectual capacity of the mind

of angels and of men, both in this world and in the other. He is inclined to widen

rather than narrow the range of attainable knowledge. He sets great value upon

mathematics and the natural sciences and especially upon metaphysics. He

rejects every unnecessary recourse to Divine or angelic intervention or to

miracles, and demands that the supernatural and miraculous be limited as far as

possible even in matters of faith. Dogmas he holds are to be explained in a

somewhat softened and more easily intelligible sense, so far as this may be

done without diminution of their substantial meaning, dignity, and depth. In

Scripture the literal sense is to be taken, and freedom of opinion is to be granted

so far as it is not opposed to Christian Faith or the authority of the Church.

Scotus was much given to the study of mathematics, and for this reason he

insists on demonstrative proofs in philosophy and theology; but he is no real

sceptic. He grants that our senses, our internal and external experience, and

authority together with reason, can furnish us with absolute certainty and

evidence. The difficulty which many truths present lies not so much in ourselves

as in the objects. In itself everything knowable is the object of our knowledge.

Reason can of its own powers recognize the existence of God and many of His

attributes, the creation of the world out of nothing, the conservation of the world

by God, the spirituality, individuality, substantiality, and unity of the soul, as well

as its free will. In many of his writings he asserts that mere reason can come to

know the immortality and the creation of the soul; in others he asserts the direct

opposite; but he never denies the so-called moral evidence for these truths.

Theology with him is not a scientific study in the strictest sense of the word, as

are mathematics and metaphysics, because it is not based upon the evidence of

its objects, but upon revelation and authority. It is a practical science because it

pursues a practical end: the possession of God. But it gives the mind perfect

certainty and unchangeable truths; it does not consist in mere practical, moral,

and religious activity Thus Scotus is removed from Kant and the modern

Gefühlstheologen, not by a single line of thought but by the whole range of his

philosophical speculation. Scotus is no precursor of Luther; he emphasizes

ecclesiastical tradition and authority, the freedom of the will, the power of our

reason, and the co-operation with grace. Nor is he a precursor of Kant. The

doctrine regarding primacy of the will and the practical character of theology has

quite a different meaning in his mind from what it has in Kant's. He values

metaphysics highly and calls it the queen of sciences. Only as a very subtle

critic may he be called the Kant of the thirteenth century. Nor is he a precursor of

the Modernists. His writings indeed contain many entirely modern ideas, e.g. the

stress he lays on freedom in scientific and also in religious matters, upon the

separateness of the objective world and of thought, the self-activity of the thinking

subject, the dignity and value of personality; yet in all this he remains within

proper limits, and in opposition to the Modernists he asserts very forcibly the

necessity of an absolute authority in the Church, the necessity of faith, the

freedom of the will; and he rejects absolutely any and every monistic

identification of the world and God. That he has so often been misunderstood is

due simply to the fact that his teaching has been viewed from the standpoint of

modern thought.

Scotus is a genuine Scholastic philosopher who works out ideas taken from

Aristotle, St. Augustine, and the preceding Scholastics. He is universally

recognized as a deep thinker, an original mind, and a sharp critic; a thoroughly

scientific man, who without personal bias proceeds objectively, stating his own

doctrines with modesty and with a certain reserve. It has been asserted that he

did more harm than good to the Church, and that by his destructive criticism, his

subtleties, and his barbarous terminology he prepared the ruin of Scholasticism,

indeed that its downfall begins with him. These accusations originated to a great

extent in the insufficient understanding or the false interpretation of his doctrines.

No doubt his diction lacks elegance; it is often obscure and unintelligible; but the

same must be said of many earlier Scholastics. Then too, subtle discussions

and distinctions which to this age are meaningless, abound in his works; yet his

researches were occasioned for the most part, by the remarks of other

Scholastic philosophers, especially by Henry of Ghent, whom he attacks

perhaps even more than he does St. Thomas. But the real spirit of scholasticism

is perhaps in no other Scholastic so pronounced as in Scotus. In depth of

thoughts which after all is the important thing, Scotus is not surpassed by any of

his contemporaries. He was a child of his time; a thorough Aristotelean, even

more so than St. Thomas; but he criticizes sharply even the Stagirite and his

commentators. He tries always to explain them favourably, but does not hesitate

to differ from them. Duns Sootus's teaching is orthodox. Catholics and

Protestants have charged him with sundry errors and heresies, but the Church

has not condemned a single proposition of his; on the contrary, the doctrine of

the Immaculate Conception which he so strongly advocated, has been declared a

dogma.

Parthenius Minges

Transcribed by Rick McCarty

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume V

Nihil Obstat, May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor

Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org

Scotism and Scotists

I. SCOTISM

This is the name given to the philosophical and theological system or school

named after John Duns Scotus (q.v.). It developed out of the Old Franciscan

School, to which Haymo of Faversham (d. 1244), Alexander of Hales (d. 1245),

John of Rupella (d. 1245), William of Melitora (d. 1260), St. Bonaventure (d.

1274), Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta (d. 1289), John Pecham (d. 1292),

Archbishop of Canterbury, Richard of Middletown (d. about 1300), etc. belonged.

This school had at first but few peculiarities; it followed Augustinism (Platonism),

which then ruled theology, and which was adopted not only by the Parisian

professors belonging to the secular clergy (William of Auvergne, Henry of Ghent,

etc.), but also by prominent teachers of the Dominican Order (Roland of

Cremona, Robert Fitzacker, Robert of Kilwardby, etc.). These theologians knew

and utilized freely all the writings of Aristotle, but employed the new Peripatetic

ideas only in part or in an uncritical fashion, and intermingled with Platonic

elements. Albertus Magnus and especially St. Thomas (d. 1274) introduced

Aristoteleanism more widely into Scholasticism. The procedure of St. Thomas

was regarded as an innovation, and called forth criticism, not only from the

Franciscans, but also from the secular doctors and even many Dominicans. At

this time appeared Scotus, the Doctor Subtilis, and found the ground already

cleared for the conflict with the followers of Aquinas. He made indeed very free

use of Aristoteleanism, much freer than his predecessors, but in its employment

exercised sharp criticism, and in important points adhered to the teaching of the

Older Franciscan School -- especially with regard to the plurality of forms or of

souls, the spiritual matter of the angels and of souls, etc., wherein and in other

points he combatted energetically St. Thomas. The Scotism beginning with him,

or what is known as the Later Franciscan School, is thus only a continuation or

further development of the older school, with a much wider, although not

exclusive acceptance of Peripatetic ideas, or with the express and strict

challenge of the same (e.g. the view that matter is the principium individuationis).

Concerning the relation of these schools to each other, or the relation of Scotus

to Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, consult the work of the Flemish

Recollect, M. Hauzeur.

Concerning the character and teaching of Scotus we have already spoken in the

special article, where it was stated that he has been unjustly charged with

Indeterminism, excessive Realism, Pantheism, Nestorianism, etc. What has

been there said holds good of Scotism in general, the most important doctrines

of which were substantially developed by Scotus himself. Little new has been

added by the Scotists to the teaching of their master; for the most part, they

have merely, in accordance with the different tendencies of the day, restated its

fundamental position and defended it. It will be sufficient here to mention two

works in which the most important peculiarities of the Scotist theology are briefly

set forth and defended -- Johannes de Rada, "Controversiae theol. inter S. Thom.

et Scotum" (1598- ); Kilian Kazen berger, "Assertiones centum ad mentem . . .

Scoti" (new ed., Quaracehi, 1906). Reference may, however, be made to the

influence which Scotism exercised on the teaching of the Church (i.e. on

theology). It is especially noteworthy that none of the propositions peculiar to

Scotus or Scotism has been censured by ecclesiastical authority, while the

doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was soon accepted by all schools,

orders, and theologians outside the Dominican Order, and was raised to a dogma

by Pius IX. The definition of the Council of Vienne of 1311 that all were to be

regarded as heretics who declared "quod anima rationalis . . . non sit forma

corporis humani per se et essentialiter" (the rational soul is not per se and

essentially the form of the human body), was directed, not against the Scotist

doctrine of the forma corporeitatis, but only against the erroneous view of Olivius;

it is even more probable that the Scotists of the day suggested the passing of

the Decree and formulated it (see B. Jansen, loc. cit., 289 sqq., 471 sqq.).

Nominalism is older than Scotus, but its revival in Occamism may be traced to

the one-sided exaggeration of some propositions of Scotus. The Scotist

Formalism is the direct opposite of Nominalism, and the Scotists were at one

with the Thomists in combatting the latter; Occam himself (d. about 1347) was a

bitter opponent of Scotus. The Council of Trent defined as dogma a series of

doctrines especially emphasized by the Scotists (e.g. freedom of the will, free

co-operation with grace, meritoriousness of good works, the causality of the

sacraments ex opere operato, the effect of absolution). In other points the canons

were intentionally so framed that they do not affect Scotism (e.g. that the first

man was constitutus in holiness and justice). This was also done at the Vatican

Council. In the Thomistic-Molinistic controversy concerning the foreknowledge of

God, predestination, the relation of grace to free will, the Scotists took little part.

They either supported one of the parties, or took up a middle position, rejecting

both the predetermination of the Thomists and the scientia media of the

Molinists. God recognizes the free future acts in His essence, and provides a

free decree of His will, which does not predetermine our free will, but only

accompanies it.

Jesuit philosophers and theologians adopted a series of the Scotist propositions.

Later authorities reject in part many of these propositions and partly accept

them, or at least do not directly oppose them. This refers mostly to doctrines

touching the deepest philosophical and theologieal questions, on which a

completely certain judgment is difficult to obtain. The following are generally

rejected: formalism with the distinctio formalis, the spiritual matter of angels and

of the soul, the view that the metaphysical essence of God consists in radical

infinity, that the relationes trinitariae are not a perfection simpliciter simplex; that

the Holy Ghost would be a distinct Person from the Son, even though He

proceeded from the Father alone; that the angels can naturaliter know the

secreta cordium (secret thoughts); that the soul of Christ is formally holy and

impeccable, not by the very fact of the hypostatic union, but through another

gratia creata (the visio beatifica); that the merits of Christ are not simpliciter et

intrinsece, but only extrinsece and secundum quid, infinite; that there are

indifferent acts in individuo; that the gratia sanctificans and the charitas

habitualis are the same habitus; that circumcision is a sacrament in the strict

sense; that transubstantiation makes the Body of Christ present per modum

adductionis, etc. Another series of propositions was misunderstood even by

Catholie theologians, and then in this false sense rightly rejected -- e.g. the

doctrine of the univocatio entis, of the acceptation of the merits of Christ and

man, etc. Of the propositions which have been accepted or at least favourably

treated by a large number of scholars, we may mention: the Scotist view of the

relation between essentia and existentia; that between ens and nihil the distance

is not infinite but only as great as the reality that the particular ens possesses;

that the accidens as such also possesses a separate existence (e.g. the

accidentia of bread and wine in the Eucharist); that not only God, but also man

can produce an esse simpliciter (e.g. man by generation); haecceitas as the

principium individuationis. Also many propositions from psychology: e.g. that the

powers of the soul are not merely accidents even natural and necessary of the

soul, that they are not really distinct from the substance of the soul or from one

another; that sense perception is not purely passive; that the intellect can

recognize the singular directly, not merely indirectly; that the soul separated from

the body forms its knowledge from things themselves, not merely from the ideas

which it has acquired through life or which God infuses into it; that the soul is not

united with the body for the purpose of acquiring knowledge through the senses

but for the purpose of forming with it a new species, i.e. human nature; that the

moral virtues are not necessarily inter se connexae, etc. Also many propositions

concerning the doctrine of the angels: e.g. that the angels can be numerically

distinct from one another, and therefore several angels can belong to the same

species; that it is not merely through their activity or the application of their

powers that angels can be in a given place; that they cannot go from place to

place without having to traverse the intermediate space; that they do not acquire

all natural knowledge from infused ideas only, but also through contemplation of

things themselves; that their will must not necessarily will good or evil, according

as it has once decided. Furthermore, that Adam in the state of innocence could

sin venially; that mortal sin, as an offence against God, is not intrinsically and

simpliciter, but only extrinsically infinite; that Christ would have become man,

even if Adam had not sinned; that the human nature of Christ had its proper

created existence; that in Christ there were two filiationes, or sonships, a human

and a Divine; that the sacraments have only moral causality; that, formally and in

the last analysis, heavenly bappiness consists not in the visio Dei, but in the

fruitio; that in hell venial sin is not punished with everlasting punishment; etc.

Scotism thus exercised also positively a wholesome influence on the

development of philosophy and theology; its importance is not, as is often

asserted, purely negative -- that is, it does not consist only in the fact that it

exercised a wholesome criticism on St. Thomas and his school, and thus

preserved science from stagnation. A comparison of the Scotist teaching with

that of St. Thomas has been often attempted -- for example, in the

abovementioned work of Hauzeur at the end of the first volume; by Sarnano,

"Conciliatio omnium controversiarum etc." (1589- ). It may be admitted that in

many cases the difference is rather in the terminology, or that a reconciliation is

possible, if one emphasize certain parts of Scotus or St. Thomas, and pass over

or tone down others. However, in not a few points the contradiction still remains.

Generally speaking, Scotism found its supporters within the Franciscan Order;

certainly, opposition to the Dominicans, i.e. to St. Thomas, made many

members of the order disciples of Scotus. However, this does not mean that the

foundation and development of Scotism is to be referred to the rivalry existing

between the two orders. Even Aquinas found at first not a few opponents in his

order, nor did all his fellow-Dominicans follow him in every particular (e.g.

Durandus of St. Pourçain, d. 1332). The Scotist doctrines were also supported

by many Minorites, of whose purity of purpose there can be no doubt, and of

whom many have been included in the catalogue of saints and beati (e.g. Sts.

Bernardine, John Capistran, Jacob of the March, Angelus of Chiavasso, etc.).

Furthermore, Scotism found not a few supporters among secular professors and

in other religious orders (e.g. the Augustinians, Servites, etc.), especially in

England, Ireland, and Spain. On the other hand, not all the Minorites were

Scotists. Many attached themselves to St. Bonaventure, or favoured an

eclecticism from Scotus, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, etc. The Conventuals

seem to have adhered most faithfully to Scotus, particularly at the University of

Padua, where many highly esteemed teachers lectured. Scotism found least

support among the Capuchins, who preferred St. Bonaventure. Besides Scotus,

the order had other highly-prized teachers, such as Alexander of Hales, Richard

of Middleton, and especially St. Bonaventure (proclaimed Doctor ecclesia by

Sixtus V in 1587), the ascetico-mystical trend of whose theology was more

suited to wide circles in the order than the critical, dispassionate, and often

abstruse teaching of the Subtle Doctor. In Spain the martyred tertiary, Blessed

Raymund Lullus (d. 1315), also had many friends. It may be said that the whole

order as such never had a uniform and special school of Scotists; the teachers,

preachers, etc. were never compelled to espouse Scotism. His disciples did

indeed call Scotus "Doctor noster", "Doctor (vel Magister) Ordinis", but even

among these many partly followed their own course (e.g. Petrus Aureolus), while

Walter Burleigh (Burlaeus, d. about 1340) and still more so Occam were

opponents of Scotus.

It is only at the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century that

a special Scotist School can be spoken of. The works of the master were then

collected, brought out in many editions, commentated, etc. Since 1501 we also

find numerous regulations of general chapters recommending or directly

prescribing Scotism as the teaching of the order, although St. Bonaventure's

writings were also to a great extent admitted (ef. Marian Fernández Garcia,

"Lexicon scholasticum etc.", Quaracchi, 1910; "B. Joan. Duns Scoti: De rerum

principio etc. ", Quaracchi, 1910, preface article 3, nn. 46 sqq., where many

regulations of 1501-1907 are given). Scotism appears to have attained its

greatest popularity at the beginning of the seventeenth century; during the

sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries we even find special Scotist chairs, e.g.

at Paris, Rome, Coimbra, Salamanca, Alcalá, Padua, and Pavia. In the

eighteenth century it had still an important following, but in the nineteenth it

suffered a great decline. One of the reasons for this was the repeated

suppressions of the order in almost every country, while the recommendation of

the teaching of St. Thomas by several popes could not be favourable to Scotism.

It has even been asserted that it is now merely tolerated; but this statement is a

priori improbable in regard to a school of which not a single proposition has been

censured, and to which so many highly venerated men (bishops, cardinals,

popes, and saints) have belonged; and it is still less probable in view of the

approval of the various general statutes (repeated so often down to the present

day), in which Scotism is at least recommended. In their Decrees Leo XIII and

Pius X have recommended not alone St. Thomas, but also Scholasticism in

general, and this includes also the Scotist School. In 1897 Leo XIII approved the

"Constitutiones Generales Fratrum Minorum", of which article 245 prescribes for

the members of the order: "In doctrinis philosophicis et theologicis antiqae

scholae Franciscanae inhaerere studeant, quin tamen ceteros scholasticos

negligant" (In philosophical and theological doctrine they shall take care to follow

the ancient Franciscan School, without, however, neglecting the other

Schoolmen.) On 11 April, 1904, in a letter to the Minister General, Father

Dionysius Schuler, Pius X expressed his pleasure at the revival of studies in the

order in connexion with the Franciscan schools of the Middle Ages, and on 19

June, 1908, in a letter to the abovementioned Father Marian, praised his book,

"Mentis in Deum quotidiana elevatio duce B. Joanne Duns Scoto etc."

(Quaracehi, 1907. See Marian, op. cit., n. 66.)

II. Scotists

Most Scotists are both philosophers and theologians.

Fourteenth Century

Pupils of Scotus: Francis Mayron (d. 1327), a very fruitful writer, who introduced

the actus sorbonicus into the University of Paris, i.e. the uninterrupted

disputation lasting the whole day. Petrus Aureolus (d. about 1322), Archbishop of

Aix. William de Rubione (about 1333). Jerome de Atharia, Order of the Blessed

Trinity (about 1323). Antonius Andreae (d. about 1320) from Aragon, a true

disciple of Scotus, who is said to have written several treatises attributed to the

master. John de Bassolis (d. about 1347). Alvarus Pelagius (d. about 1350).

Bishop Petrus de Aquila (d. 1371), called Scotellus from his faithful adherence to

Scotus, of whose teaching he issued a compendium (new ed., Levanti, 1907- ).

Landulf Caraccioli (d. 1351), Archbishop of Amalfi. Nicolaus Bonet (Bovet), who

went to Peking and died as Bishop of Malta in 1360; John Bacon, Carmelite (d.

1346).

Fifteenth Century

William Butler (d. 1410). Petrus de Candia (d. 1410 as Pope Alexander V).

Nicolaus de Orbellis (d. about 1465), who wrote a commentary on the Sentences

(many editions) William Vorilong (Vorlion etc., d. 1464), a celebrated theologian,

who wrote a frequently quoted "Comm. super Sentent.", but who also followed

St. Bonaventure. Angelus Serpetri, General of the Order (d. 1454). William Gorris

(about 1480), not a Franciscan, who composed the "Scotus pauperum". Blessed

Angelus of Chivasso (d. 1495), whose "Summa" (called Angelica) is extant in

about thirty editions and contains a great deal of Scotist doctrine; it was publicly

burned by Luther with the "Corpus juris canonici" in 1520. Antonius Sirretus

(Sirectus, d. about 1490), famous for his "Formalitates", to whieb several later

Scotists wrote commentaries. Tartaretus (about 1495), rector of the University of

Paris, and not a Franciscan; Elector Frederick III of Saxony had his philosophical

commentaries introduced into the University of Wittenberg at his expense.

Thomas Pencket, Augustinian (d. 1487), knew Scotus almost by heart, and

edited his works. Francis Sampson, General of the Order (d. 1491), was called

by Pope Sixtus IV, before whom he held a disputation, the most learned of all.

Francis de Rovere (d. 1484 as Sixtus IV), who defended in a disputation before

Pius II and also in his writings the doctrine that the blood shed by Christ on the

Cross was released from the hypostatic union. Stephen Brulefer (d. about 1499),

renowned professor in Paris and later a Franciscan, who wrote "Comm. in

Bonavent. et Scotum" (often edited).

Sixteenth Century

This period is very rich in names. The following may be mentioned: Paul

Scriptoris (d. 1505), professor at the University of Tübingen, who had as students

all the other professors and many other members of religious orders. Nicholas de

Nüsse (d. 1509). Mauritius a Portu (d. 1513 as Archbishop of Tuam, Ireland), who

wrote a commentary on many works of Scotus. Francis Lichetus, General of the

Order (d. 1520). Anthony Trombetta, Archbishop of Athens (d. 1518), who wrote

and edited able Scotist works. Philip Varagius (about 1510). Johannes de Monte

(about 1510). Gometius of Lisbon (d. 1513), re-edited the often issued

fourteenth-century "Summa Astesana". Frizzoli (d. 1520). James Almainus

(about 1520), Parisian magister and not a Franciscan, favoured Gallicanism.

Antonius de Fantes, physician, composed in 1530 a Scotus lexicon. Jerome

Cadius (d. 1529). Le Bret (about 1527), wrote "Parvus Scotus". Paduanus

Barletta (about 1545). James Bargius (about 1560). Johannes Dovetus, who

wrote in 1579 "Monotesseron formalitatum Scoti, Sieretti, Trombettae et

Bruliferi". Joseph Angles, bishop and celebrated moralist (d. 1587), wrote the

often edited "Flores theol. ". Damian Giner issued the "Opus Oxoniense Scoti" in

a more convenient form (1598). Cardinal Sarnanus (d. 1595), a highly

distinguished scholar, wrote a commentary on some philosophical works of

Scotus, and edited the works of many Scotists. Salvator Bartolucci (about 1586),

also a zealous editor. Felix Perettus (d. 1590 as Sixtus V).

Seventeenth Century

Of very many names we may mention: Gothutius (about 1605). Guido

Bartholucci (about 1610). Petrus Bonaventura (about 1607). Ruitz (about 1613)

Smissing (d. 1626). Philip Faber (d. 1630). Albergonius, bishop (d. 1636).

Centini, bishop (d. 1640). Matthaus de Sousa (about 1629). Merinero, bishop

(about 1663). Francis Felix (about 1642). Vulpes (d. 1647) wrote "Summa" and

"Commen. theologiae Scoti" in twelve folio volumes. Blondus, bishop (d. 1644) -

Gavatius, archbishop (d. 1658). Wadding (d. 1657), a well-known annalist, edited

with other Irishmen in the College of S. Isidore at Rome the complete works of

Scotus (12 vols., Lyons, 1639), with the commentaries of Pitigianus of Arezzo (d.

1616), Poncius (d. 1660), Mauritius a Portu (Mac Caughwell), Archbishop of

Armagh and Primate of Ireland (d. 1626), and Anthony Illckey (d. 1641); reprinted

Paris, 1891-95. Bricemo, named on account of his keenness of intellect the

Second Scotus, Bishop of Venezuela (d. 1667). Belluti (d. 1676), edited with

Mastrius a highly prized "Philosophia ad mentem Scoti" (many editions).

Mastrius himself (d. 1673) wrote a celebrated "Disputationes theol." (many

editions) and "Theologia ad mentem Scoti" (1671, etc.). Ferchius (d. 1666) wrote

"Vita et apologia Scoti, etc." Bruodinus (d. 1664). Herinckx (d. 1678), Bishop of

Ypres. Stümel (d. 1681 at Fulda). Boivin, highly esteemed philosopher and

theologian (several editions of works, 1678, etc.) Sannig (about 1690). Lambrecht

(about 1696), named the Viennese Scotus. Bishop Gennari (d. 1684). Cardinal

Brar `catius (d. 1693), held in high favour by several popes. Hernandez (d.

1695).-Macedo (d. 1681), a Portuguese, professor at Padua is said to have

composed over one hundred writings and was renowned for his public

disputations.

Eighteenth Century

Frassen (d. 1711) was for thirty years a celebrated professor at the Sorbonne

and wrote "Scotus academicus seu universa theo Scoti" (many editions, 1672,

etc.; last ed., Rome 1900- ), a very profound and lucid work. Du randus (d. 1720)

wrote the great "Clypeus scotisticus (many editions). Dupasquier, "Summa phil."

an "Summa theol." (about 1720; many editions). Hieronymus a Montefortino

"Duns Scoti Summ. theol. ex universis opp. eius . . . juxta ordiner Summae

Angelici Doctoris" (6 vols., 1728-34; new ed., Rome, 1900-03), a very able work.

Panger (d 1732 at Augsburg), Scotist moralist. Kikh (d. 1769 at Munich), Scotist

dogmatic theologian. Pérez López (d. 1724). Krisper (d. 1749). Hermann, Abbot

of St. Trudbert, "Theologia sec. Scoti principia" (1720). Melgaco (1747). Bishop

Sarmentero (d. 1775).

Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

In the nineteenth century, although Scotism was retained in the schools of the

Franciscan Order in accordance with the statutes, we meet but few tractates

secundum mentem Scoti, in any case no celebrated ones. The twentieth century

appears to promise better. Father Fernández, a Spaniard, is a zealous Scotist.

Beside the abovementioned writings, he has written a large "Scotus Lexicon",

and is at present (1911) issuing new edition of Scotus's "Comment. in Sentent.'

Another zealous worker is Father Deodat-Marie de Basley; his fortnightly journal,

"La bonne parole" (now entitled "Revue Duns Scot."), contains much Scotistica.

He is also engaged on the "Capitali opera B. Joan. Duns Scoti" (Le Havre, 1908)

of which the "Praeparatio philosophica" and "Synthesis theologica credendorum"

have already appeared. Father Parthenius Minges has explained and defended

much of the Scotist doctrine in his "Compend. theolog. dogmat. specialis et

generalis" (Munich, 1901-02), and in a number of other works.

Parthenius Minges

Transcribed by Kevin Cawley

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIII

Nihil Obstat, February 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, D.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org